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TORT LAW: JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
UNDER COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE - FORCING
OLD DOCTRINES ON NEW CONCEPTS
Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1987)
Respondent was injured on a ride at petitioner's amusement park.'
Respondent sued petitioner and a jury found respondent fourteen percent at fault, respondent's fiance eighty-five percent at fault, and
petitioner one percent at fault.2 Applying the doctrine of joint and
several liability, the trial court entered judgment against petitioner
for the full eighty-six percent of damages. 3 The Fourth District Court
of Appeal affirmed. 4 On certification, s the Florida Supreme Court
affirmed, 6 and HELD, adopting comparative negligence did not
7
necessitate eliminating joint and several liability.
Florida judicially adopted the doctrines of contributory negligence8
and joint and several liability.9 Under contributory negligence, a negligent plaintiff was barred from any recovery. 10 Even a slightly negli1. 515 So. 2d 198, 199 (Fla. 1987). Respondent's fiance rammed respondent's miniature race
car from behind on a grand prix attraction. Id.
2. Id. The Florida Supreme Court abrogated the contributory negligence doctrine and
adopted the pure comparative negligence standard. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla.
1973). Thus, a negligent plaintiff is no longer barred from recovery and a jury is allowed to
apportion fault between negligent parties. Id. at 438-39. See Lawrence v. Florida E. Coast Ry.,
346 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1977) (juries are required to use special verdicts to allocate fault in all
comparative negligence actions).
3. 515 So. 2d at 199. Petitioner could not seek contribution from the other defendant because
of family immunity defense. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 339 (5th ed. 1984).
4. 515 So. 2d at 199. The district court cited Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla.
1975) as controlling. Id.
5. Id. (the court had jurisdiction pursuant to FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4)). The question
certified was "DOES THE HOLDING IN LINCENBERG v. ISSEN DICTATE AN AFFIRMANCE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IN THIS CASE?" Id.
6. Id. at 202.
7. Id. Justice Grimes wrote for the majority. Id. at 199. Chief Justice McDonald filed a
dissenting opinion in which Justices Overton and Shaw concurred. Id. at 202-06. Justice Overton
also filed a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 206.
8. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Yniestra, 21 Fla. 700 (1886). See 515 So. 2d at 202 (McDonald,
C.J., dissenting). Joint and several liability ameliorated the harshness of contributory negligence.
Id. at 205. Inherent inequities in the tort system required full compensation for innocent plaintiffs. Id.
9. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Allen, 67 Fla. 257, 65 So. 8 (1914). See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
10. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 469. Thus the plaintiff bore the burden of an injury
caused by at least two people. Id.
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gent plaintiff had to bear all costs of an injury. 1 The doctrine of joint

and several liability" evolved concurrently with the contributory negligence doctrine. 13 Under joint and several liability, a plaintiff may
recover total damages from any jointly liable defendant. Courts

reasoned that injuries are indivisible and fault cannot be apportioned.
Therefore, between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the
14
negligent parties should bear the costs.
Recently, however, the Florida Supreme Court discarded con-

tributory negligence and implemented pure comparative negligence. 1
The supreme court followed a policy-oriented approach and found com-

parative negligence was a more equitable and socially warranted
method of fault and liability allocation.' 6 While it did not address the
continuing efficacy of joint and several liability, the court noted that

problems encountered with comparative negligence should be handled
with its purposes in mind. 7 Thus, Florida became the first state to
8
judically adopt comparative negligence.

11. Id.
12. Id. at 475.
13. Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1091 (Fla. 1987).
14. Id. The court stated defendants should bear the risk because they will spread the
burden of compensating a plaintiff to all consumers through insurance. Id.
15. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). A plaintiffs damages are reduced by the
proportion of fault attributable to the plaintiff. Id. at 436. The court asserted contributory
negligence was inequitable to burden one party with the loss when more were at fault. Id. In
a tort system based on fault, comparative negligence is more consistent because fault is apportioned among negligent parties. Id. For example, if a jury finds a plaintiff 20% at fault and two
defendants are 70% and 10% at fault, the plaintiffs damages are reduced by 20%. Thus, the
defendants are liable for 80% of the total damages. Id. at 439.
16. Id. at 437. In deciding to abolish the common law doctrine of contributory negligence,
the court noted it could modify a rule in the absence of legislation when great social upheaval
dictated. Id. at 435.
17. Id. at 439. The court recognized that adopting comparative negligence affects assumption
of the risk and no contribution between joint tortfeasors concepts. However, the court declined
to address these issues because the court may not consider unripe issues and a body of Florida
case law already exists concerning comparative negligence. Id. Comparative negligence was
adopted to allow a jury to apportion fault between negligent parties and to apportion total
damages according to the percentage of fault of each party. Id.
18. Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1081, 1091 (Fla. 1987). Seven states have
judicially adopted the doctrine after Florida: Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, appeal afterremand,
572 P.2d 775 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858 (1973); Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981); Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d
742 (Iowa 1982); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979);
Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981); Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256
S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979). See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 471 n.28.
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Shortly, after the change to comparative negligence, the Florida

Supreme Court upheld the viability of joint and several liability. 19 In
Linwenberg v. Issen,20 two negligent defendents injured an innocent
plaintiff.21 The jury returned a verdict in plaintiffs favor and apportioned fault between the defendents at eighty-five percent and fifteen
percent.Y The court abolished the doctrine prohibiting contribution

among joint tort-feasors23 citing the purpose of comparative negli-

gence

and the recently enacted Contribution Act.r2 In dictum, the

court interpreted a section of the Contribution Act as fully retaining
joint and several liability.26 Although the court considered different
methods of equitable apportionment of damages among tortfeasors,"
it deferred to the legislature and held the Contribution Act retains

19. Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386, 392 (Fla, 1975).
20. Id. at 386. The question certified on appeal was
WHERE THE PLAINTIFF, IN AN AUTOMOBILE INJURY ACCIDENT
CASE SUES TWO DEFENDANTS, ALLEGING BOTH TO BE NEGLIGENT
RESULTING IN INJURIES TO THE PLAINTIFF, IS IT PROPER FOR THE
TRIAL JUDGE TO ALLOW THE JURY TO APPORTION FAULT AS IT SEES
FIT BETWEEN THE NEGLIGENT DEFENDANTS, THEREFORE, WAS IT
PROPER IN A CASE WHEREIN THE PLAINTIFF SUED TWO DEFENDANTS, ALLEGING EACH NEGLIGENTLY OPERATED TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY TO APPORTION FAULT AND SUBMIT THE FOREGOING SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES TO THE JURY?
Id. at 388.
21. Id. at 387. Plaintiff was a passenger in a car involved in a collision with defendant's
car. Id.
22. Id.
23. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 336-41. This doctrine barred a defendant liable for
damages from being reimbursed by a jointly liable tortfeasor. Id. at 337. Consequently, one
defendant bears the entire burden of a judgment. Id. at 338. See also Note, Modification of
Joint and Several Liability: Who Bears the Risk?, 11 NOVA L.J. 165 (1986).
24. 318 So. 2d at 390-91. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. See also Note, The
ModifJwation of Joint and Several Liability: Considerationof the Uniform ComparativeFault
Act, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 291, 292-94 (1984).
25. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1975) (Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act). This
statute abrogated the common law bar against contribution between joint tortfeasors. 318 So.
2d at 392.
26. 318 So. 2d at 392. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1975) provides in part, "where two or more
persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, or
for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them." Id.
27. 318 So. 2d at 392 n.2. The court does not state why it rejected the other alternatives,
but chose to uphold the doctrine of joint and several liability because the legislature included
it in the Contribution Act. Id. The court considered pure apportionment whereby a defendant's
apportioned percentage of fault is the defendant's total liability. Id. The court also considered
retaining joint and several liability and allowing defendants to seek contribution from other
defendants based upon their apportioned percentage of fault. Id.
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joint and several liability. Several decisions affirming the new doctrine
cited Lincenberg as controlling precedent.28
In Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc.,29 the Illinois Supreme Court
analyzed the consistency between joint and several liability and comparative negligence.30 In Coney, the defendant in a wrongful death
action requested its total liability be limited to its apportioned percentage of fault. In effect, the defendant argued for abrogating joint and
several liability.3 1 The court refused to abolish the doctrine for policy
reasons. 32
The Illinois court voiced concerns of fairness to plaintiffs. Under
comparative negligence, the plaintiffs recovery is reduced by the plaintiffs proportion of fault.m Consequently, plaintiffs would suffer an
undue burden if their damages were further reduced because a defendant was immune or insolvent.t 4 The court concluded wrongdoers
should redress the injured party and seek contribution among themselves.m
The Kansas Supreme Court looked at fairness to plaintiffs and
defendants, and to legislative intent in deciding to abolish joint and
several liability in comparative negligence actions.3 6 In Brown v.
Keill,37 the court found one defendant ten percent at fault and another
ninety percent 5 Under Kansas' comparative negligence statute, 39 the

28. See, e.g., Borden, Inc. v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 772 F.2d 750 (11th Cir. 1985); Woods
v. Withrow, 413 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 1982). Both courts summarily dismissed assertions that the
doctrine of joint and several liability was inconsisent with comparative negligence.
29. 97 Ill. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983).
30. Id. at 119-24, 454 N.E.2d at 204-06. The victim was killed while operating a work
platform manufactured by the defendant. Id. at 109, 454 N.E.2d at 199. Defendant asserted
the victim was negligent in operating the platform and the victim's employer was negligent for
not providing sufficient training or a groundman. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 121-24, 454 N.E.2d at 205-06. The court identified four reasons for retaining the
doctrine which were first advanced in American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.
3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978). Id. See Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore,
605 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1979); Tucker v. Union Oil Co., 100 Idaho 590, 603 P.2d 156 (1979); Seattle
First Natl Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 588 P.2d 1308 (1978).
33. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
34. 97 Ill. 2d at 122-23, 454 N.E.2d at 205.
35. Id.
36. See Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 203-04, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (1978) (Kansas statutorily
adopted comparative negligence). The statute was designed to abolish contributory negligence
and award damages based on the party's proportionate fault. Id. at 197, 580 P.2d at 870.
37. Id. at 203, 204, 580 P.2d at 873, 874.
38. Id. at 196, 580 P.2d at 869. Defendants were involved in an auto accident. Plaintiff is
one defendant's father and seeks a judgment to recover car repair costs. Id.
39. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1974).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol40/iss2/7

4

Garcia-Mendoza: Tort Law: Joint and Several Liability Under Comparative Negligenc
CASE COMMENTS

plaintiff recovered ten percent of the total damages. 40 Plaintiff appealed, contending the trial court failed to apply joint and several
liability. 41 The supreme court stated the legislature intended to abolish
the doctrine.4 The court also stated that retaining the doctrine was
inconsistent with the purposes of comparative negligence.4 The unfair-

ness of contributory negligence to plaintiffs had been abrogated.Therefore, the court found no social policy required defendants to
account for damages in excess of their percentage of fault. 45
The instant case provided the Florida Supreme Court with an

opportunity to review joint and several liability under comparative
negligence. 4 6 In a four to three decision, the instant court affirmed
the district court and upheld joint and several liability in a comparative
tive negligence jurisdictions retained the doctrine while others had it
judicially or legislatively abolished. 49 Conceding that joint and several

liability was judicially created,6° the instant court nevertheless determined that public policy considerations required legislative resolution
of the doctrine's continuing viability.5 ' Furthermore, the Contribution

40. 224 Kan. at 197, 580 P.2d at 869.
41. Id. at 200, 580 P.2d at 872.
42. Id. at 203-04, 580 P.2d at 873-74. The court cited numerous authorities, cases, and
comments to show the legislature's intent. Id. The legislature intended to equate obligation to
pay to proportion of fault. Id. Furthermore, since joint and several liability was no longer viable
under comparative negligence, the doctrine of contribution among tortfeasors became unnecessary. Id. at 203-05, 580 P.2d at 874-75. Because each negligent party would be liable only for
their apportioned percentage of fault, there was no need for contribution. Id.
43. Id. at 203, 580 P.2d at 874. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
44. 224 Kan. at 203, 580 P.2d at 874. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
45. 224 Kan. at 203, 580 P.2d at 874. The court stated it was inherently unfair to require
a defendant who was 10% at fault to bear 100% of the damages. Id.
46. 515 So. 2d 198.
47. Id. at 198, 202.
48. Id. at 201. See, e.g., Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1979);
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182
(1978); Tucker v. Union Oil Co., 100 Idaho 590, 603 P.2d 156 (1979); Coney v. J.L.G. Indus.,
Inc., 97 Ill. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983); Kirby Bldg. Sys. v. Mineral Explorations, 704 P.2d
1266 (Wyo. 1985).
49. 515 So. 2d at 200-01. See, e.g., Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867 (1978);
Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982); Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1978).
50. 515 So. 2d at 200. Justice Overton's dissent stated that the court abdicated its responsibility by letting the legislature decide the fate of a judicially established doctrine. Id. at 206.
51. Id. at 202.
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Act as amended, significantly restricted the doctrine's applicability.

The majority refused to abrogate joint and several liability because
the legislature did not completely abolish it.53
The instant court echoed the Coney decision's policy arguments

justifying retention of joint and several liability. First, although culpability under comparative negligence may be apportioned between plaintiffs and defendants, the injury remains indivisible 4 Second, the plaintiffs contribution to personal injury is not tortious conduct, unlike the
defendant's negligence. 5 Finally, eliminating the doctrine would seri-

ously impair the plaintiffs opportunity for a remedy

6

The instant

57

court cited these policy reasons and upheld joint and several liability.
Thus, Lincenberg and its progeny are still controlling precedent in
Florida.
In a vigorous dissent, Chief Justice McDonald criticized the major-

ity for retaining joint and several liability 8 Applying comparative
negligence to plaintiffs while retaining joint and several liability responsibility for defendants constituted a "mismatch of legal concepts."59
The chief justice advocated repudiating joint and several libility when
the comparative negligence doctrine applied. 60Additionally, the dissent

52. FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (1987) (provides in part that the doctrine of joint and several
liability only applies in actions of less than $25,000).
53. 515 So. 2d at 201-02.
54. Id. at 201. But see Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646
P.2d 579 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982). The one divisible wrong
concept arose from common law pleading and joinder technicalities which are now outdated;
therefore, it should not be applied in comparative negligence actions. Id. at 158, 646 P.2d at 585.
55. 515 So. 2d at 201.
56. Id. But see 98 N.M. at 158, 646 P.2d at 585. The court was bewildered by the fact
that an additional defendant would be liable for the fault of another defendant. Id. The court
suggested if there were just one plaintiff and defendent, the plantiff would bear the burden of the
defendant being insolvent or immune. Id. However, simply shifting the risk to the defendant
with the "deep pocket" would be indefensible. Id.
57. 515 So. 2d at 201. Another policy argument made by the Coney court concerned the
possibility an innocent plaintiff would have to bear some of the loss if the doctrine was abolished.
Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 97 Ill. 2d 104, 122, 454 N.E.2d 197, 205 (1983). This consideration
is not applicable in the instant case since the comparative negligence doctrine only arises in the
context of a negligent plaintiff. Moreover, joint and several liability could be retained for non-comparative negligence actions to ensure innocent plaintiffs receive a full recovery.
58. 515 So. 2d at 202-06 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 202 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting). Under comparative negligence, the fault of the
plaintiff is separated from the fault of the defendants. Id. However, in joint and several liability,
all defendants are liable for the entire judgment. Id. Consequently, opposite theories apply to
plaintiffs and defendants. Id.
60. Id. (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).
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faulted the majority opinion for relying on Lincenberg.61 The chief
justice argued Lincenberg was not relevant and statements concerning
the Contribution Act should not have been interpreted to codify joint
and several liability.62
63
The dissent called the majority's policy arguments indefensible.
According to the chief justice, the common law theory of an indivisible
wrong was inapplicable because under comparative negligence, fault
is routinely apportioned. Moreover, the dissent disagreed with the
majority's contention that joint and several liability be retained to
ensure that plaintiffs collect entire judgments.r Plaintiffs should now
bear the risk of defendants being judgment-proof or insolvent.67
The dissent also recognized that joint and several liabiltiy applies
to all defendants, not just large corporate defendants which can absorb
the costs of an adverse judgment. 3 Even if only slightly negligent,
joint and several liability could bankrupt less solvent businesses or
individuals. 69 Consequently, the dissent favored abrogating joint and
several liability when the plaintiff is not fault-free. 70
Although the instant court relied on Lincenberg as controlling and
cited Coney's policy arguments, weaknesses in the cases undermine
their precedential value. Lincenbergi involved a fault-free plaintiff.
Joint and several liability ensures that between an innocent victim
and negligent tortfeasors, the defendants will bear the costs.7 2 Since
the Linwenberg plaintiff was not negligent, the court discussed retaining joint and several liability under comparative negligence in dictum.
61. Id. at 202-03 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).
62. Id. (McDonald, C.J., dissenting). The chief justice argued a literal reading of the Contributions Act results in application only when joint and several liability is found. Id. at 203.
Moreover, this was the same interpretation given to the Act by the New Mexico Supreme Court
in Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 154, 646 P.2d 579, 581 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982), affirmed sub nom., Taylor v. Delgarno
Transp., Inc., 100 N.M. 138, 667 P.2d 445 (1983).
63. 515 So. 2d at 204 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting). The chief justice asserted the majority
opinion's fundamental justifications were indefensible as totally inconsistent with Florida's modern tort scheme. Id. The goal of comparative negligence is to create a tort system that equitably
allocates damages. Id. at 206. A defendant's liability should be based on damages caused by
the defendant, not the defendant's ability to pay. Id.
64. Id. at 204-05 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting). See supranotes 13-14 and accompanying text.
65. 515 So. 2d at 205 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).
66. Id. (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).
67. Id. (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).
68. Id. (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).
69. Id. (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 206 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).
71. Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975).
72. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
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Thus the Lincenberg decision should not have controlled because the
joint and several liability issue was not ripe.3 The instant court also
borrowed policy argument from the Coney decision. The Coney74 court,
however, failed to consider equity to defendants. By adopting joint
and several liability, defendants became liable for all damages while
only apportioned liability previously existed7 Retaining joint and several liability would thus be unfair to defendants.76 Courts should also
consider fairness to defendants when deciding the viability of joint
and several liability in comparative negligence actions. The instant
court misplaced reliance on Lincenberg and Coney, which may result
in relitigation of the issue of joint and several liability under comparative negligence.
In contrast, the BrownP court reached a middle ground, balancing
equities between plaintiffs and defendants. The court abolished joint
and several liability in comparative negligence situations, but implicitly
retained it in actions brought by fault-free plaintiffs. When a plaintiff
is innocent, joint and several liability ensures the plaintiff collects the
entire judgment. When a plaintiff is negligent, comparative negligence
limits the defendants' liabilities to their apportioned percentage of
fault. The Brown decision, therefore, supports the underlying principle
of comparative negligence that each party is liable for their own proportion of fault. 78
The instant court relied on policy to validate joint and several
liability. However, the court may have implicitly sanctioned other
policies. As the dissent cogently pointed out, not every defendant is
a large corporation with the ability to absorb the loss. 7Yet the instant
decision encourages plaintiffs to sue everyone remotely connected to

73.

See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 439 (Fla. 1973). The supreme court stated it

was not a proper function of the court to decide unripe issues because of inadequate briefing,
lack of an adversarial atmosphere, and lack of a specific factual situation. Id.
74. Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983).
75. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
76. See Note, supranote 23, at 165. For example, if a negligent plaintiff and three negligent
tortfeasors are each 25% at fault for plaintiffs injuries, and two of the defendants are insolvent,
the one solvent defendant will have to pay 75% of the total damages to the negligent plaintiff
because the defendants are jointly and severally liable for their cumulative damages. Furthermore, the responsible defendant must seek contribution from the insolvent defendants for reimbursement of 50% of the damages. Since this is highly unlikely, one defendant ends up paying
75% of the damages solely because the other defendants were insolvent.
77. Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867 (1978).
78. Id. at 203, 580 P.2d at 873.
79. Id. at 205. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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the injury in hope of finding a "deep pocket." 8 Thus, insurance and
litigation costs will increase for both corporate and individual defendants.8l The cost to society may be great as tort actions force less
solvent corporations and individuals into financial turmoil to satisfy
judgments. 2
Second, retaining joint and several liability under comparative negligence will probably increase litigation. Already overburdened court
dockets will have to accommodate lawsuits which will invariably arise
between defendants seeking contribution from other defendants. 3 Finally, the instant decision may discourage industrial expansion into
Florida. Companies may have reservations about expanding into
Florida if their slight negligence could subject them to large tort
awards. The impact of the instant decision may therefore have unforeseen and unintended ramifications.
The chief justice's dissent and the Brown decision offer an alternative analysis to the instant and Coney opinions. Under the former
analysis, courts should retain the doctrine of joint and several liability
for non-comparative negligence actions to ensure that innocent plaintiffs are fully compensated.8 However, when a plaintiff is also negligent, the equitable principles behind comparative negligence" should
govern. Parties should only be liable for their apportioned percentage
of fault.8
Tort liability sometimes results in inequities. Our judicial and legislative systems strive to limit the occasions upon which inequities arise.
Thus, Florida became the first state to adopt comparative negligence
judicially 5 While preventing one inequity, the Florida Supreme Court
has created another by retaining joint and several liabflityr in comparative negligence actions. No social policy can compel one party to pay
for another's fault.9 Yet, non-fault based compensation occurs because

80. See Note, supra note 23, at 165.

81. Id. at 191.
82.
83.
84.
text.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

515 So. 2d at 205 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).
See Note, supra note 23, at 165.
515 So. 2d at 206 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting). See also supra note 25 and accompanying
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
515 So. 2d at 206 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 202 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
515 So. 2d at 202 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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of the instant decision. Perhaps the supreme court will one day return
to their stated purpose for adopting comparative negligence and "apportion the total damages... according to the proportionate fault of
each party."91 Until then, however, inequitable judgments like the
instant decision will occur.
Armando Garcia-Mendoza

91.

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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